Guerillas

Overview

In Leavenworth Papers #11 “Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War

II,” Dr. Michael J. King notes that “The rescue of 511 American and Allied prisoners from a Japanese POW compound near Cabanatuan in the Philippines by elements of the 6th Ranger Battalion, reinforced by Alamo Scouts and Filipino guerrillas, was the most complex operation that Rangers conducted during World War II. It was also one of the most successful.”[1]

CPT Prince’s raid plan called for the Alamo Scouts to provide much needed information, for the Rangers to assault the camp to secure the POWs, and for the Filipino Guerillas to isolate the objective area from counterattacking Japanese.[2]

“[The guerillas’] part of the plan was exceedingly risky, but [Captains] Pajota and Joson, working in tandem, had to seal off a solid mile of road and hold it long enough for the Rangers to attack the camp, remove the prisoners, and then cross back over, melting safely into the rice paddies in the deepening night. The two Filipino forces were to function as a synchronized pair of shutoff valves in a great water main, temporarily blocking the flow in both directions so the Rangers could go in and do their extraction work with little worry of a surprise surge in the pipe.”[3]

Captain Eduardo Joson (future Governor of Nueva Ecija Province) was to prevent a Japanese counterattack from Cabanatuan City. CPT Juan Pajota (who suggested the 24-hour delay, the use of caraboa carts, and the Black Widow distraction) was to prevent a Japanese counterattack from Cabu.[4]

CPT Pajota’s 350-man guerilla force consisted of five ‘infantry squadrons’, one ‘weapons squadron’ (with three M1917 .30-caliber, water-cooled heavy machine guns and a Rangers bazooka team[5]) and one Alamo Scout Team capable of establishing three observation posts and controlling two available P-61 Black Widows (each armed with four 20mm cannons and four .50 caliber machine guns). [Other P-61s support Captains Prince and Joson] The guerillas also had a dozen antitank mines and one improvised explosive device with timer.[6]

Special Situation: Consider the guerillas as a battalion-sized force (as depicted in figure 1), each squadron as a light infantry company comprised of light infantry ‘platoons’ (with 25-30 guerillas and one medic in each platoon), with machine gun crews depicted in squadrons 201 and 201A (each carrying 1,000 rounds of ammunition), and the bazooka team (with 20 rounds of ammunition) depicted in Squadron 201A. Again, this special situation modifies, simplifies and clarifies some of the information from the Leavenworth Papers. In instances where the Leavenworth Paper and this assignment differ (such as in unit designations and composition) use the information provided in the assignment.

Pajota’s Guerillas were tasked to block the Japanese Imperial Army’s Dokuho 359, an 800-man infantry battalion augmented by six Type 97 medium tanks.[7] Although most Japanese were retreating northeast, General Tomoyuki Yamashita ordered Commander Oyabu’s Dokuho 359 forward to strengthen his defenses at Cabanatuan City. Dokuho 359 bivouacked east of the Cabu River on 29 and 30 January and had orders to begin its advance to Cabanatuan City at midnight on the 30th. To do so, they would cross the new 75 feet long, 21 feet wide heavy timber bridge

at Cabu, which replaced the bridge the guerillas had destroyed in 1944.[8] The composition of Dokuho 359 is depicted in Figure 2 while its disposition is illustrated on the enemy course of action and on the sketch[9] Dokuho 359 does not have any mortars, artillery, or air support.

Mission: On order, Dokuho 359 destroys allied forces in the vicinity of the Pangatian Camp to prevent them from securing the allied POWs.

Commander’s Intent: The purpose of the operation is to demonstrate Japanese resolve. In order to do so, the battalion must cross the Cabu River, quickly penetrate allied security forces, destroy the allied assault force, pursue escaping allies and secure the camp and POWs until relieved. At end state, the allied forces are destroyed, the POWs detained, conspiring civilians punished, the battalion controls the camp and is prepared to reinforce the Japanese defense of Cabanatuan City.

Decisive Operation: D Company (armor) counterattacks west along the Cabanatuan-Cabu Highway and destroys the allied assault force to prevent the escape of the POWs.

Shaping Operations:

B Company secures the Cabu bridge in order to facilitate D Company’s counterattack, and then follows D Company as the battalion reserve with priority of commitment to D, A and C Companies.

A Company fords the Cabu River and destroys allied forces north of the highway to prevent them from engaging D company.

C Company fords the Cabu River and destroys allied forces south and east of the camp to prevent them from engaging D company.

Fires. Dohuko 359 has no indirect fires capability or dedicated air support.

Information Collection operations focus on: 1) detecting allied forces within our area of

operations; 2) disposition of the Cabu bridge; 3) location of escaped allies; and 4) civilian conspirators.

Sustainment Operations. Immediate resupply of Class III and Class V at the POW camp for follow on operations. Casualties requiring Role 1 care will be treated at the battalion aid station; Role II and higher will be stabilized and evacuated to the regimental medical company.

Tactical Risk is assumed by advancing the armor along the Cabanatuan-Cabu highway to rapidly overwhelm the Rangers and the POWs. The infantry will mitigate this risk by destroying any ambush positions between Cabu River and the camp.

Requirement: As the S-3 of Pajota’s Guerillas located at a clandestine patrol base near

Platero on 28 January 1945, develop a doctrinal course of action statement and sketch for Pajota’s Guerillas.

Remember, this Special Situation is different from the one which the guerillas actually

faced in the Leavenworth Papers. This assignment requires you to create a unique solution to the problem in the special situation rather than attempting to recreate CPT Pajota’s solution.  Since this scenario is different from the one CPT Pajota faced, do not try to replicate the COA he used. For example, placing guerillas near Manacnac to help prevent Dohuko 359 from crossing the Cabu River may accept significant risks for little benefit. Although some situations and examples have phased operations with shifting main efforts and more than one decisive operation, try to make your COA relatively simple by identifying one decisive point, one decisive operation at that point, and one squadron to conduct that  decisive operation

1. COURSE OF ACTION STATEMENT

1. Write a mission statement for Pajota’s Guerillas. Pay special attention to the time and task in this mission. The time must be synchronized with the Rangers assault (do not use ‘on order’ or ‘be prepared’). Although history records that Pajota’s Guerillas virtually destroyed Dokuho 359, doing so was not required. Remember, the task in the mission should accomplish as little as needed to fulfill the purpose, rather than as much as possible—since the difference is often measured in lives.

• Develop a Commander’s Intent. Remember, the Purpose here should be

‘broader’ than the one in your mission, that Key Tasks normally become the focus of Decisive and Shaping Operations, and that the End State must include Friendly, Enemy, Terrain and Civil components.

• Decisive Operation (DO). Consider the following questions, and then write a

mission statement for the squadron conducting the DO.

What single task is most decisive (if you could do just one task, what would it be? How

does that task contribute to the end-state for Pajota’s Guerillas?)

Why?

Where?

When should it begin?

Which squadron do you envision conducting this operation?

• Shaping Operations (SO). Write a mission statement for each of the five

squadrons which shape the decisive operation by accomplishing a key task, sets conditions for the decisive operation, or serves as a reserve. In each case, the purpose of the squadron’s operation must logically connect to the decisive operation as well as the overall mission of Pajota’s Guerillas.

• Fires. Write a mission statement for the pair of Black Widows which have very

limited ammunition, but can make a significant contribution. This force should have a very specific task against a very specific target.

• Intelligence. List specific priority information requirements (PIRs) needed for

Pajota to make the two anticipated decisions: (1) commit the reserve and (2) commit the Black Widows. The Alamo Scouts should be positioned to collect and report this information

• Sustaining. Provide a brief plan for the treatment & transport of guerillas

injured near the Cabu River.

• Risk. Address the most significant risk as well as measures to mitigate it.

2.  COURSE OF ACTION SKETCH

1. Depict each squadron (sketch) with the proper task organization composition

symbol (see Fig 1 of this assignment and Fig 10-1 of ADRP 1-02) and doctrinal tactical

mission task symbol (see Chapter 9 of ADRP 1-02).

• Keep in mind that you may want to change the task organization of some squadrons by moving platoons and/or weapons teams to another squadron, and that the number of platoons and special weapons (machine guns and bazookas) should be based on the task and purpose of the squadron, as well as the enemy the squadron is responsible for and the terrain that squadron is operating in.

• Remember that you must depict six ‘squadrons’ which collectively have 12 infantry platoons, 4 machine gun teams, and 1 bazooka team. Although task organization is often required, refrain from disbanding or merging two or more squadrons such that a squadron commander works for another or has no men or mission.

• Doctrinal unit boundaries clearly delineate each squadron’s area of operation

as well as the boundaries for Pajota’s Guerilla Battalion

• Doctrinal control measures (such as battle positions, objectives, engagement

areas, axes, target reference points (TRPs) and checkpoints) to help connect the COA statement to the sketch.

• Command post and observation posts doctrinally depicted

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[1] King, Dr. Michael J, Leavenworth Papers #11 Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II, CSI 1985 p55

[2] Sides, Hampton, Ghost Soldiers, Doubleday 2001 p176-7

[3] Ibid, p177

[4] Ibid, p128, 130, 179, 333

[5] http://olive-drab.com/od_other_firearms_mg_m1917.php lists the effective range of the M1917A1 machine gun at 2500 yards. War Dept TM 9-294 gives the bazooka an effective range of 300 yards

[6] Johnson, Forrest Bryant, Hour of Redemption, Warner 2002, p186-8, 194-7 (squadron sizes estimated)

[7] Ibid, p165

[8]  Ibid, p96

[9] Ibid, based on CPT Pajotas’ Cabu Bridge Battle Plan, pii