US Military Operations

Readings

“Operation Chromite” Chapter 2, Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

JP 5-0, Joint Planning (2017)

JP 1-0, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2013)

JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2014)

JP 3-0, Joint Operations (2017)

Overview

In June 1950, forces of the North Korea’s People’s Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea with the intent of unifying Korea. President Truman ordered General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief Far East, to use his air and sea forces to support the Republic of Korea forces south of the 38th Parallel. General MacArthur visited Korea to personally assess the situation and realized that only the immediate commitment of ground forces could stop NKPA forces. NKPA spearheads were successful in pushing United Nation forces south to the Naktong River. General Walton Walker, Commander of the US Army Eighth Army, and General MacArthur decided that they must stand and fight or be ejected from Korea. It was here that the 140 mile long Pusan Perimeter was established. General MacArthur’s successful campaigns across the Pacific during World War II gave him deep appreciation for amphibious operations. He decided upon an amphibious operation, Operation Chromite, for his counterattack. The planning and execution of Operation Chromite by General Douglas MacArthur in September 1950 established the operational art that guides joint operations today. Modern warfare demands a joint approach (JP 5-0).

Operational Environment

JP 5-0 states that “The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander…Included within these areas are the adversary, friendly, and neutral actors that are relevant to a specific joint operation.” The Commander must be able to describe the current environment and how the environment should look when operations conclude to visualize an approach to solving the problem.

Question 1.  Describe the operational environment in the summer of 1950 from the reading Operation Chromlite. 

Question 2.  What does the current operational environment look like?  Describe the conditions that have led up to the dire situation facing the U.S. 8^th Army at the Pusan Perimeter.

Question 3.  How does General MacArthur’s vision for Operation Chromite relieve NKPA pressure on the 8^th Army in the Pusan Perimeter?

Strategic Guidance

JP 5-0 states that “The President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff with appropriate consultation with additional NSC members, other USG departments and agencies, and multinational partners formulate strategic end states with suitable and feasible national strategic objectives that reflect US national interests.”

Question 1.  What does General MacArthur’s vision for the operational environment once Operation Chromite is concluded?

Question 2.  What are the roles of JTF 7 and X Corps in achieving General MacArthur’s end state?

Decisive Points

JP 5-0 states that a “decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective).”

Question 1.  Identify and justify two key decisive points for Operation Chromlite.

Operational Maneuver

JP 3-0 describes maneuver as “the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be key to the JFC’s mission accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological effects, and physical momentum. Maneuver also may enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.”

Question 1.  Describe how Operation Chromite supports the breakout of the 8^th Army at the Pusan Perimeter.

Question 2.  Explain how Operation Chromite reverses the situation at the Pusan Perimeter.  Ensure to address operational maneuver.

Question 3.  Explain how Operational Chromite places the Allied forces in an advantageous position over the NKPA.   Ensure to address operational maneuver.

Joint Fires

JP 3-09 states that “Integral to the CONOPS is the concept of fires. The concept of fires describes how lethal and non-lethal joint fires will be synchronized and integrated to support the Joint Force Commander’s operational objectives. The JFC determines the enemy’s center of gravity (COG), associated critical factors, and decisive points and how the application of fires can assist in creating the desired effects to attain the objective.”

Question 1.  You are the Fires Officer on General MacArthur’s staff.  Gen. MacArthur has tasked you to describe your concept of how Joint Fires will support Operation Chromite.  He asked you to specifically describe joint fire support for:

(1) Land forces and Inchon.

(2) Attacking the NKPA’s lines of communication.

(3) Interdicting any NKPA attempts to counterattack or reinforce forces in vicinity of Inchon and Seoul.

Operational Reach

JP 5-0 states that “Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.”

Question 1.  Explain how the Marines, Navy, Air Forces provided General MacArthur with operational reach in Operation Chromite.

Question 2.  Explain how that operational reach provided an advantage to the Allies over just reinforcing the 8^th Army inside the Pusan Perimeter.  Include all three US services Marines, Navy and Air Force.

7. Arranging Operations

JP 5-0 states that “Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement often will be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to reach the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose. Planners should consider factors such as simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo when arranging operations.”

Question 1.  Describe how General MacArthur’s staff used the following in executing Operation Chromite in conjunction with 8^th Army activities inside the Pusan Perimeter.

(1) Simultaneity

(2) Depth

(3) Timing

(4) Tempo

Defeat Mechanisms

JP 5-0 states: “Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. Combat aims at defeating armed enemies – regular, irregular, or both, through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all means necessary.”

Question 1. Select two of the four defeat mechanisms below. Explain how General MacArthur used the defeat mechanism to defeat the NKPA for reach. (Refer to JP 5-0, page IV-31)

(1) Destroy

(2) Dislocate

(3) Disintegrate

(4) Isolate

Direct and Indirect Approach

JP 5-0 states: “The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity (COG).”

Question 1.  Explain which approach did General MacArthur use in Attacking the NKPA.

 

Question 2.  Explain why he chose that approach.

Operational Risks

According to JP 5-0, “Operational risk defines aspects of the campaign or operation in which the commander will accept risk in lower or partial achievement or temporary conditions. It also describes areas in which it is not acceptable to accept such lower or intermediate conditions.”

Question 1. Identify five (5) major risks associated with Operation Chromite.

Question 2.  Explain how General McArthur’s staff mitigated those five major risks.

Risk 1:

Mitigation

Risk 2:

Mitigation

Risk 3:

Mitigation

Risk 4:

Mitigation: